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1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant Utah Code Ann.
§78-2a-3(1996).
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issues of law are reviewed under a correctness standard, without deference to the
trial court. Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115 (Utah 1998).
An "abuse of discretion" standard is applied to determinations under Rule 404(b) of
the Utah Rules of Evidence, not the "very limited deference" standard of State v.
Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997). State v. DeCorso, 1999 UT 57, ffll6-18, 370 Utah
Adv. Rep. 11, 12. The DeCorso opinion clearly gave weight to Justice Zimmerman's
separate opinion in Doporto and hoped to avoid "diminishing the relative importance of
the trial court's judgment and enhancing that of the appellate court." Id. at ^16. With
respect to the balancing of probativeness verses prejudice under Rule 403, State v.
O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694 (Utah 1993), cert denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993), reveals the
historical deference given to trial court determinations of this nature: "When reviewing a
trial court's balancing of the probativeness of a piece of evidence against its potential for
unfair prejudice under Rule 403, we reverse only if the court's decision as a matter of law
'was beyond the limits of reasonability.' State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah
1992)." O'Neil at 699.
2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Officer Gilbert Salazar of the Salt Lake City Police Department was dispatched to
the apartment of Tiffany Brimhall in Salt Lake City on the night of July 18, 1998.
Arriving at the apartment complex, Officer Salazar heard "a loud banging" on a window
on the south side of the complex. Trial Transcript (hereinafter "Tr.") at 27,11. 22-23.
There he found the Defendant/Appellant, Roger Alires, banging on Ms. Brimhall's
window. The talkative (Tr. at 29,11. 2-3) Mr. Alires informed Officer Salazar that he
lived at that apartment, and that his child and significant other were inside. Id., 11. 5-7.
While another officer continued to speak with Mr. Alires, Officer Salazar went in to
the apartment and met with Tiffany Brimhall. He perceived Ms. Brimhall to be "very
scared" (Tr. at 30,1. 3), to the point that "it was kind [of] hard to understand" her (Id., 11.
10-11) through her "quivering voice" (Id., 1. 9) and the fact that "she was talking very
rapidly..." (Id., 1. 10). Based on his discussion with Ms. Brimhall, Officer Salazar
determined that Mr. Alires was not a resident of the apartment at the time and Ms.
Brimhall did not want him there. Mr. Alires was allowed to enter the apartment to get a
shirt, and was then released.
Just over an hour later, Officer Jill Candland1 of the Salt Lake City Police
Department was dispatched to the same apartment. She found Tiffany Brimhall to be
"hesitant to open the door without me identifying who I was." Tr. at 34,1. 9-10. Once
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inside, Officer Candland observed that Ms. Brimhall "was very upset, ... speaking in ... a
quiet voice, but very, very nervous, ... and [she] appeared to have been crying at some
point, her eyes were red and she was ... shaking." Tr. at 34,11. 14-18.
I would describe her body language as very closed in, it was like she
was trying to protect herself with her shoulders hunched inf. S]he
was tearful, [her] voice was shaking, she was very upset. But [she
was] speaking in a low voice, not agitated and screaming[. S]he was
almost to the point of ... being kind of shockfy], [in] disbelief.
Tr. at 36,11. 1-7.
In this emotional state, Ms. Brimhall related to Officer Candland the events earlier
when Roger Alires had come to her apartment and Officer Salazar had come there. Tr. at
37,1. 6. Ms. Brimhall further related that Mr. Alires had just telephoned her and told her
"that he had a knife and that he was going to do something with it and ... that she took
that as a serious threat and [that] she was very frightened." Id., 11. 10-13. At this time, still
in the condition of being "very upset" and while "she was describing the phone call" (Tr.
at 38,11. 11-12), Ms. Brimhall's telephone rang again. Ms. Brimhall "picked up the phone
and said, 'Hello' and then looked at [Officer Candland,] and holding the receiver in her
hand she pointed to the mouth piece with her finger and mouthed the word[s], That's
him' ... [or] Tt'shim'... ." Id., 11. 18-21.

1

Officer Candland is referred to variously as Jill "Camdland" and "Joel Cammeron"
among the interesting transcriptions of the trial Transcript provided by Appellant.
Nevertheless, no Officer Cammeron was involved in this matter.
4

Officer Candland stepped to the phone and overheard the rest of the conversation,
during which Ms. Brimhall confronted the caller about the threats received in the earlier
telephone call. Rather than deny the threatening nature of that earlier call, the caller said
that if Ms. Brimhall "did not take him back, if he could not be with her and his daughter,
he would kill her. He repeated this three times. He also said that she would need to watch
the daycare." Tr. at 40-41,11. 23-1.
At that point Officer Candland took the phone and announced, "Mr. Alires, this is
[0]fficer Candland ... you've made a serious mistake making this threat on the phone."
Tr. at 41,11. 2-3. Rather than deny the Officer's identification of him as "Mr. Alires," the
caller simply "yelled a profanity into the phone and hung up." Id., 1. 5.
Defendant/Appellant Roger Alires was subsequently charged with Telephone
Harassment, a class B misdemeanor under Salt Lake City Code section 11.08.030. He was
convicted of that offense at a jury trial on February 22, 1999.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANT'S APPEARANCE AT TIFFANY BRIMHALL'S APARTMENT WAS
PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE FOR IDENTIFICATION PURPOSES

Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence clearly delineates that "prior acts"
testimony may be admissible to show identity. Applying the framework of State v.
DeCorso, 1999 UT 57, 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, to the case at hand indicates that evidence
of Defendant/Appellant Roger Alires' (hereinafter, "Appellant") prior appearance at the
5

victim's home was appropriately admitted for identification purposes. At no point did the
prosecution offer this evidence for any purpose other than identification. As an element of
the offense, identity is per se relevant. Appellant's appearance at the apartment was not
evidence of a crime, but only of an act. Against the low potential for prejudice stemming
from that act stands the highly probative nature of the testimony. DeCorso and rule
404(b) are satisfied.

II.

A FIRMLY ROOTED HEARSAY EXCEPTION DOES NOT VIOLATE THE STATE OR
FEDERAL CONFRONTATION CLAUSES

As a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the "spontaneous declaration," or excited utterance,
has been held by the United States Supreme Court to not violate the federal Confrontation Clause
even without a finding of the declarant's unavailability. Also, given the context in the present
case, where additional indicia of reliability are plentiful and the declaration was offered only for
identification purposes and not to show the corpus of the offense, the allowed evidence satifies
the concerns of both state and federal confrontation clauses. No analysis has been provided to
indicate that the state protections in this instance should be different from the federal. In fact,
state case law indicates that the Utah Supreme Court has already found the federal approach to be
appropriate. Should this Court decide to adopt some version of Appellant's proposed
unavailability rule, Appellee urges the Court to define "unavailability" on a continuum based on
the level of the offense and the potential punishments.
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III. T H E STATE CONSTITUTION'S CONFRONTATION CLAUSE SHOULD N O T B E
INTERPRETED DIFFERENTLY THAN THE FEDERAL CLAUSE

Appellant ignores State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995), in which the Utah
Supreme Court incorporated the reasoning of White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 112 S.Ct.
736 (1992), in the context of analyzing Utah's excited utterance exception. Appellant has
failed to provide an analysis of Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution (Utah's
Confrontation Clause) to show why it should be interpreted differently from previous
Utah case law or federal law on this issue.
IV.

T H E QUESTION OF "AVAILABILITY" SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN TERMS OF THE
LEVEL OF THE OFFENSE

The question of whether or not the witness Tiffany Brimhall was "unavailable" is
not clear from the record. The record reflects only that the prosecution believed that a
subpoenaed witness had been contacted by an agent of the government within a matter of
days before trial and that the witness, though afraid, would be present. Given the
questionable availability of the witness, then, coupled with the high level of reliability of
the hearsay offered in this particular case, reversal is an inappropriate remedy. However,
should this Court decide to adopt some version of Appellant's proposed unavailability rule,
Appellee urges the Court to define "unavailability" based on the level of the offense and the
potential punishments.

V. THE OVERHEARD TELEPHONE CALL IS NOT HEARSAY

Appellant claims that the telephone caller's statements were hearsay. However, rule
801(d) establishes that statements by a party, which are offered against that party, are not
hearsay. In addition, because the threats made by Appellant embodied the charged
offense, the probative nature outweighs any prejudicial effect.
ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANT'S APPEARANCE AT TIFFANY BRIMHALL'S APARTMENT WAS
PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE FOR IDENTIFICATION PURPOSES

A. Rule 404(b) does not require a showing of a similar fashion or pattern
Evidence of Appellant's earlier appearance at the home of Tiffany Brimhall was
admitted, over Appellant's motion in limine, for identification purposes. Tr. at 3,11. 2425. Appellant argues that this ruling was incorrect because evidence of his appearance at
the home should be excluded under a rule 404(b) analysis.
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence clearly delineates that "prior acts"
testimony may be admissible to show identity.
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In other words, evidence
offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a noncharacter purpose and meets the requirements of Rules 402 and 403.
Utah R. Evid. 404(b).
8

The recent Utah Supreme Court case of State v. DeCorso, 1999 UT 57, 370 Utah
Adv. Rep. 11, provided a framework for rule 404(b) analyses. Appellant, however, is
reversing the logic of DeCorso, as well as that of State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069 (Utah
1987), to meet his own ends. Neither DeCorso nor Johnson limit "prior acts" testimony to
the purpose of showing a "common plan, scheme, or manner of operation." Instead, these
cases limit the allowable purpose of "common plan" testimony to proving a material fact
such as identity. This limitation helps to assure that the "common plan" is not offered to
show a propensity to commit crime.
In any event, the evidence at issue in the present case is not evidence of a common
plan, scheme, or manner of operation. Moreover, identity of the perpetrator is clearly a
material fact.
Applying the framework of DeCorso to the case at hand indicates that evidence of
this prior appearance was appropriately admitted for identification purposes. The
DeCorso framework includes the following elements:
... [W]e now explain the proper analysis to be applied by the trial
court in deciding whether to admit evidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or bad acts under rule 404(b).
As the amendment to rule 404(b) now makes clear, in deciding
whether evidence of other crimes is admissible under rule 404(b), the
trial court must determine (1) whether such evidence is being offered
for a proper, noncharacter purpose under 404(b), (2) whether such
evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, and (3) whether this
evidence meets the requirements of rule 403.
Under the first part of this analysis, the proponent must
demonstrate that the evidence is actually being offered for a proper,
noncharacter purpose, such as those specifically listed in the rule.
9

State v. DeCorso, 1999 UT 57, f][19-21, 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 13 (emphasis added).
In addressing Appellant's motion in limine to exclude testimony of Appellant's
earlier appearance at the home, the trial court ruled that "it's relevant to the issue of the
identification^] so I'm going to deny that [motion.]" Tr. at 3,11. 24-25. The trial court's
ruling was correct. Identification, as will be discussed at length in this brief, was the crux
of this case for the prosecution and is a "proper, noncharacter purpose" that is
"specifically listed" in rule 404(b). At no point did the prosecution offer the testimony of
Appellant's recent appearance at the home for any purpose other than identification. The
first prong of DeCorso is satisfied.
The second prong of DeCorso requires that the offered evidence is relevant pursuant
to the definition of relevance under rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. As an
element of the offense, identity is always relevant.
When evidence may establish constitutive elements of the crime of
which the defendant is accused, in the case on trial, it is admissible
even though it tends to prove that the defendant has committed other
crimes. See State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960 (Utah 1989), and cases
cited therein; see also State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah
1987) {evidence of other crimes was probative and necessary to
prove identity of defendant)', State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106, 1110
(Utah 1985)....
State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added). Therefore, the
second prong of DeCorso is satisfied.

10

B. Evidence of Appellant's appearance at the victim's home was
more probative than prejudicial
As indicated, Utah case law has established that even duplicate prior crimes can be
admissible for identification purposes. The prejudicial effect of evidence of prior crimes
is considered under the third prong of DeCorso, which calls for a balancing of the
potential prejudicial effect against the probativeness of offered evidence, pursuant to
evidentiary rule 403.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
Utah R. Evid. 403. With regard to this third prong balancing, DeCorso clarified that there
is "no presumption against the admission of other crimes evidence if it was being offered
for a proper, noncharacter purpose." DeCorso at ^24. By comparison, the evidence at
issue here—Appellant's recent appearance at the victim's apartment—could not be as
prejudicial as the kinds of duplicate crimes at issue in DeCorso or Johnson. In DeCorso,
for example, duplicate manners of operation in an unadjudicated burglary were allowed
for identification purposes. In Johnson, evidence of a prior, duplicate forgery offense was
held to be "directly probative on the issue of identity" because a witness to the prior
offense identified the defendant, as well as "indirectly probative" as to identity because of
similarities in the offenses.

n

Appellant's appearance at the apartment was not evidence of a crime, but only of an
act. He was not cited or arrested for any offense when the police arrived. No testimony
was offered of conduct similar to that involved in the Telephone Harassment charge, such
as threatening language or behavior. In fact, Appellant was allowed to enter the home,
accompanied by Officer Salazar, in order to change his shirt.
Against the relatively low potential for prejudice stemming from this act stands the
highly probative nature of the testimony. In this case of Telephone Harassment,
Appellant's recent appearance at the home of the recipient of the offending call provided
compelling evidence that he was in fact the caller. During that appearance at the home,
Salt Lake City police officer Gilbert Salazar saw Appellant there and spoke to him.
Officer Salazar could therefore connect the name "Roger Alires" to the defendant sitting
in court. In addition to telling Officer Salazar his name, during this contact Appellant told
the officer, "my baby's in there" (Tr. at 29,1. 5) and, although the officer couldn't recall
specifically, that either Alires' "wife or his girlfriend was in there" (Id., 1.7).
This evidence was vital in order to connect Appellant to the later telephone call
overheard by Officer Jill Candland. In that overheard call, the caller stated "that if he
could not be with [Ms. Brimhall] and his daughter, he would kill [Ms. Brimhall]." Tr. at
40,11. 23-24. "He also said that she would need to watch the daycare." Id. at 40-41,11.
25-1. Appellant's appearance at the home so recently, his acknowledged relationship with
the inhabitants of the home, and his evident concern with those inhabitants {see, supra,
12

Appellee's Statement of Facts) act as weighty evidence of identification when combined
with the content of the telephone call overheard by Officer Candland.
[The] tendency [of evidence of other crimes] to lead the finder of
fact to an improper basis for decision must... be balanced against its
probative nature and the need for such evidence in proving a
particular issue. E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence, § 190, at 565
(3d ed. 1984) suggests the factors to be evaluated in the balancing
process:
The problem is not merely one of pigeonholing, but of
classifying and then balancing. In deciding whether the
danger of unfair prejudice and the like substantially
outweighs the incremental probative value, a variety of
matters must be considered, including the strength of
the evidence as to the commission of the other crime,
the similarities between the crimes, the interval of time
that has elapsed between the crimes, the need for the
evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof and the
degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the
jury to overmastering hostility.
State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295 (Utah 1988) (emphasis added). As indicated, the need
for evidence was of the highest level in the instant case. Further, because this conduct of
Alires' appearance at the house was, at worst description, a bad act, not rising to the level
of abhorrent behavior or a charged or duplicate crime, it was not the sort of evidence that
would "rouse the jury to overmastering hostility." Id.
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II.

A FIRMLY ROOTED HEARSAY EXCEPTION DOES NOT VIOLATE THE STATE OR
FEDERAL CONFRONTATION CLAUSES

A. The excited utterance exception is a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception
Appellant has not contested on appeal the trial court's rulings that the statements
made to Officer Candland by Tiffany Brimhall (discussing Roger Alires and mouthing the
words "It's him" when the second call came in) were excited utterances.2 (See, supra,
Appellee's Statement of Facts; see also Tr. at 7,11. 20-22 CI believe the pro[ff]er ...
would clearly be admissible under the excited utterance doctrine"), Tr. at 34-35,11. 23-1,
and Tr. at 36,11. 16-17.) Nevertheless, the nature and context of those utterances,
discussed in more detail below, are important in regard to Appellant's constitutional
challenges. Therefore it is necessary to emphasize the favored status of the excited
utterance exception in the eyes of this nation's highest court.
For over one hundred years, the United States Supreme Court has been "careful 'not
to equate the Confrontation Clause's prohibitions with the general rule prohibiting the
admission of hearsay statements,' Idaho v. Wright, (1990) 497 U.S. 805, 814, 110 S.Ct.
3139, 3146 ...." White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352, 112 S.Ct. 736, 741 (1992).
Nevertheless, in those instances where hearsay exceptions do not fall under the "firmly
rooted" banner, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States

"Alires does not dispute, for the purposes of this appeal, the trial court's ruling that,
under current Utah law, the evidence could fall under the excited utterance exception."
Br. of Appellant at 20, n. 2.
14

Constitution protects defendants from out-of-court declarations presented as evidence
without "sufficient guarantees of reliability." Id, 502 U.S. at 356, 112 S.Ct. at 743.
The hearsay exception known in the common law as the "spontaneous declaration,"
however, has been codified as the "excited utterance" in both rule 803(2) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence3 and in rule 803(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. It is considered to
be one of the most firmly rooted of the traditional hearsay exceptions. As noted in the
unanimous United States Supreme Court decision of White v. Illinois,
... the evidentiary rationale for permitting hearsay testimony
regarding spontaneous declarations ... is that such out-of-court
declarations are made in contexts that provide substantial guarantees
of their trustworthiness.[Footnote 8]
[Footnote 8:] Indeed, it is this factor that has led us to conclude that
"firmly rooted" exceptions carry sufficient indicia of reliability to
satisfy the reliability requirement posed by the Confrontation Clause.
See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 817, 820-821 (1990) Bourjaily v.
United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182-184 (1987). There can be no doubt
that the two exceptions we consider in this case are 'firmly rooted."
The exception for spontaneous declarations is at least two centuries
old, see 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence, 1747, 195 (J. Chadbourn rev.
1976), and may date to the late 17th century. See Thompson v.
Trevanion, 90 Eng.Rep. 179 (K.B. 1694). It is currently recognized
under the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 803(2), and in nearly
four-fifths of the States. See Brief of Amici Curiae for the State of
California, et al., pp. 15-16, n. 4 (collecting state statutes and cases).
•••

Id, 502 U.S. at 355 n.8, 112 S.Ct. at 742 n.8.

3

The federal rule's language closely mirrors that of Utah (or vice versa): "A statement
relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of
excitement caused by the event or condition." Fed. R. Evid. 803(2).
15

The U.S. Supreme Court recently reiterated its commitment to the spontaneous
declaration / excited utterance as a "firmly rooted" exception to the hearsay rule in dicta
in Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S.Ct. 1887 (1999). In Lilly the Court also reiterated its position
"that the veracity of hearsay statements is sufficiently dependable to allow the untested
admission of such statements against an accused when (1) 'the evidence falls within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception' or (2) it contains 'particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness... .'" 4 Lilly, 119 S.Ct. at 1898.
B. As a firmly rooted hearsay exception, admission of an excited utterance
does not contravene the confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment
or the Utah Constitution
1. Excited utterances are inherently reliable
Appellant asks this Court to establish the same "'wholesale revision of the law of
evidence' under the guise of the Confrontation Clause" that has been rejected by the
United States Supreme Court. White, 502 U.S. at 354, 112 S.Ct. at 741, quoting U.S. v.
Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394,106 S.Ct. 1121, 1125 (1986). When a case raises the issue of
hearsay exceptions, the White court reasoned, it "'must be read consistently with the
question it answered, the authority it cited, and its own facts.'" Id.
Doing just that in U.S. v. Inadi, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a situation where
statements of a co-conspirator had been accepted as evidence even though there was no
4

The Lilly Court held that "an accomplice's statements that shift or spread the blame to a
criminal defendant" are not firmly rooted under federal law, nor do they contain sufficient
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showing of unavailability. The Inadi situation was highly analogous to the present case,
where a declarant subpoenaed by the government simply failed to appear.
Other parallels exist between the co-conspirator situation in Inadi and the excited
utterance situation of the present case:
In addition, the relative positions of the parties will have changed
substantially between the time of the statements and the trial. The
declarant and the defendant will have changed from partners in an
illegal conspiracy to suspects or defendants in a criminal trial, each
with information potentially damaging to the other. The declarant
himself may be facing indictment or trial, in which case he has little
incentive to aid the prosecution, and yet will be equally wary of
coming to the aid of his former partners in crime. In that situation, it
is extremely unlikely that in-court testimony will recapture the
evidentiary significance of statements made when the conspiracy was
operating in full force.
Inadi, 475 U.S. at 395, 106 S.Ct. at 1126. By adopting and paraphrasing the above
language from Inadi, we can apply that court's reasoning to the present case, as follows:
The relative positions of parties in an ongoing relationship—such as estranged
former cohabitants who have a child together—will usually have changed in the months
between an excited utterance and a trial. The declarant and the defendant will have
changed from the fear and intensity of the moment at issue to a state of truce, or even a
renewed state of affection. Or, the declarant herself may be facing continued fear of the
defendant, perhaps even threats from him. Under either scenario, the declarant may have
little incentive to either reopen wounds that are months old, or to incur the wrath of the
guarantees of trustworthiness without the opportunity for cross examination. Lilly, 119
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defendant all over again. In either situation, it is extremely unlikely that in-court
testimony will recapture the evidentiary significance of statements made when the
"excitement" of the moment was in full force.
What Ms. Brimhall's testimony would have been at the time of trial is unknown.
However, it would have been testimony in addition to, and not in place of, the contested
excited utterance. "[I]f the declarant either is unavailable, or is available and produced by
the prosecution, the statements can be introduced anyway." Id, 475 U.S. at 396, 106 S.Ct
at 1126-1127. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the concept of a "constitutional 'better
evidence' rule" (Id.) for good reason. No trial testimony can replace the probative nature
of an excited utterance made at the time of an offense.
Like the co-conspirator statements at issue in Inadi, no "strong similarities exist
between [excited utterance] statements and live testimony at trial." Id., 475 U.S. at 395396, 106 S.Ct at 1126.
To the contrary, [excited utterance] statements derive much of their
value from the fact that they are made in a context very different
from trial, and therefore are usually irreplaceable as substantive
evidence. Under these circumstances, 'only clear folly would dictate
an across-the-board policy of doing without' such statements.
Advisory Committee's Introductory Note on the Hearsay Problem,
quoted in Westen, The Future of Confrontation, 77 Mich.L.Rev.
1185, 1193, n. 35(1979)."
Id. The admission of the excited utterance "actually furthers the 'Confrontation Clause's
very mission' which is to 'advance "the accuracy of the truth-determining process in
S.Ct. at 1898.
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criminal trials.'" Tennessee v. Street, All U.S. 409, 415, 105 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 85
L.Ed.2d 425 (1985), quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89, 91 S.Ct. 210, 220, 27
L.Ed.2d 213 (1970)" Id. The admission of such firmly rooted hearsay exceptions
advances the truth-determining process by putting before the trier of fact declarations of a
probative nature that cannot be matched by in-court testimony.
Inadi acted as a limitation of the scope of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), a
case interpreted by some as issuing a general rule that a finding of unavailability is
required before the admission of even firmly rooted hearsay exceptions. This is the rule
that Appellant asks this Court to impose. Appellant's expansive reading of the
Confrontation Clause, however, was negated also by the U.S. Supreme Court in White v.
Illinois. In White, a unanimous5 United States Supreme Court concurred with Inadi that it
was an overly expansive reading of Ohio v. Roberts to "suggest that the Confrontation
Clause generally requires that a declarant either be produced at trial or be found
unavailable before his out-of-court statement may be admitted into evidence." White v.
Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 353, 112 S.Ct. 736, 741.
White v. Illinois involved an objection to hearsay evidence of a child's excited
utterances about a sexual assault. The White court adopted the rationales discussed supra
in terms of Inadi.
These observations [in Inadi], although expressed in the context of
5

A concurring opinion issued by Justices Thomas and Scalia would have applied an even
more narrow reading of the Confrontation Clause, leading to the same result.
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evaluating co-conspirator statements, apply with full force to the
case at hand. We note first that the evidentiary rationale for
permitting hearsay testimony regarding spontaneous declarations ...
is that such out-of-court declarations are made in contexts that
provide substantial guarantees of their trustworthiness.[ ] But those
same factors that contribute to the statements' reliability cannot be
recaptured even by later in-court testimony. A statement that has
been offered in a moment of excitement—without the opportunity to
reflect on the consequences of one's exclamation—may justifiably
carry more weight with a trier of fact than a similar statement offered
in the relative calm of the courtroom.
Id., 502 U.S. at 355-356, S.Ct. at 742-43.
The White court could not have been more explicit in its rejection of the general
unavailability rule:
We therefore think it clear that the out-of-court statements admitted
in this case had substantial probative value, value that could not be
duplicated simply by the declarant's later testifying in court. To
exclude such probative statements under the strictures of the
Confrontation Clause would be the height of wrong-headedness,
given that the Confrontation Clause has as a basic purpose the
promotion of the '"integrity of the factfinding process.'" Coy v.
Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988) (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482
U.S. 730, 736 (1987)). And as we have also noted, a statement that
qualifies for admission under a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception is
so trustworthy that adversarial testing can be expected to add little to
its reliability. Wright, 497 U.S., at 820-821.
White, 502 U.S. at 356-357, 112 S.Ct. at 743.
Appellant has provided two non-binding cases as examples of other states' courts
that have questioned the application of White in all situations. The cases provided,
however, concern situations where the courts were asked to go to the other extreme—to
find that firmly rooted exceptions to the hearsay rule are always admissible without
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consideration of Confrontation Clause concerns. Generally, following Inadi and White,
the finding that a hearsay declaration falls within a firmly rooted exception means that
there are sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to overcome Confrontation Clause
concerns. Appellee acknowledges that there may be situations in which a declaration rises
to the level of an excited utterance but the surrounding indicia of reliability are not
sufficient even for a firmly rooted hearsay exception to overcome the Confrontation
Clause.
There is no reason, however, for the kind of extreme, across-the-board rule
encouraged by Appellant. Inadi and White do not stand for the proposition that
availability can never be a factor. The Inadi court, in fact, simply limited the scope of
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), stating that "Roberts cannot fairly be read to stand
for the radical proposition that no out of court statement can be introduced by the
government without a showing that the declarant was unavailable." Inadi, 475 U.S. at
395, 106 S.Ct. at 1126 (emphasis added). This is exactly the radical proposition that
Appellant asks this court to turn into state law. But there are simply too many legal and
factual nuances for such a "general answer to the many difficult questions arising out of
the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and hearsay." Id., 475 U.S. at 392, 106
S.Ct. at 1124. Rather than diving blindly from the "height of wrong-headedness" {White,
502 U.S. at 357, 112 S.Ct. at 743) as Appellant proposes, the reasonable approach is to
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view firmly rooted hearsay exceptions as creating a presumption of constitutionality,
which trial courts could review on a case-by-case basis, each in its own context.
2. The context of statements at issue provides the highest level of reliability
Context in this case is everything. Like statements of a co-conspirator, an excited
utterance "often will derive its significance from the circumstances in which it was
made." InadU 475 U.S. at 395, 106 S.Ct. at 1126. The context of the statements in this
case offer indicia of reliability that exemplify the fundamental concept of Inadi and
White: that a hearsay declaration can derive sufficient value from the context in which it
was made to be irreplaceable as substantive evidence.
The first contextual factor supporting the reliability of the statements at issue here is
the nature of the declarations themselves. The declarations here identified the caller to
police, when Tiffany Brimhall excitedly uttered to Officer Candland that Roger Alires
had just called, and then mouthed the words, "It's him." Officer Candland heard the
offense of Telephone Harassment take place, and that officer was available for crossexamination at trial. Appellant, then, was not convicted on the basis of an offense that was
described to the trier of fact by an unavailable witness. This was the situation in one of
the cases cited by Appellant, State v. Case, 752 P.2d 356 (UT App 1987). Like most of
the scenarios cited by Appellant, Case did not involve a firmly rooted exception to the
hearsay rule. Instead, Case involved evidence in the form of prior testimony, which the
U.S. Supreme Court distinguished in Inadi. "[F]ormer testimony often is only a weaker
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substitute for live testimony. It seldom has independent evidentiary significance of its
own, but is intended to replace live testimony." Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394, 106 S.Ct. at 1126.
By contrast with the identification-oriented declarations of Tiffany Brimhall, the
hearsay at issue in Case exemplifies the broad variations of hearsay. Case involved an
aggravated assault that allegedly occurred when the defendant and the victim were alone
in a hotel room.
Defendant could only be found guilty through the victim's testimony
that he stabbed her and that she was not in the process of trying to
end her life. The right of confrontation is most critical in a situation
such as this. Two conflicting stories are told with little or no
corroborative evidence available.
Case, 752 P.2d 356, 358. As mentioned, prior testimony by itself does not approach the
level of inherent reliability found in excited utterances. However, even if the hearsay
evidence in Case had been an excited utterance about the alleged event, it would not have
held the reliability of the statements in the present case. Tiffany Brimhall's excited
utterances were made before any offense occurred and were admitted into evidence solely
for the purpose of identification. In Case, the hearsay embodied the offense itself.
The second contextual factor indicating the statements' reliability is the substantial
testimony supporting the trial court's ruling that Ms. Brimhall's declarations were, in fact,
excited utterances. See, supra, Appellee's Statement of Facts. Not one, but two officers,
separated by an hour, separately observed the "excited nature" of Ms. Brimhall. Officer
Candland in particular described in detail Ms. Brimhall's multiple physical symptoms
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indicating that she was "under the stress of excitement caused by the event[s]" that she
related. Utah R. Evid. 803(2).
Furthermore, the statements were nearly contemporaneous and precisely
contemporaneous to the events that inspired them. First, Ms. Brimhall told Officer
Candland that her boyfriend Roger Alires had called her since the last officers had left,
less than an hour before. Tr. at 27,11. 14-17, at 33,1. 14, at 36,11. 20-24, and at 37,11. 910. Then she mouthed the words "That's him" or "It's him" immediately upon hearing the
caller's voice when the phone rang in the officer's presence.
Usually the most difficult issue in determining the admissibility of an
excited utterance is whether the statement was uttered with a
spontaneity produced by emotional excitement to a degree that
provides a warrant of trustworthiness. The determination requires an
evaluation of a variety of factors, including the nature of the startling
event and the intensity of the excitement or other emotional effect on
the declarant. [ ] The statement need not be strictly contemporaneous
with the startling event to be spontaneous, ... but the justification for
the exception disappears as the emotional excitement of the declarant
subsides and the declarant's capacity for reflection revives. Thus,
although the utterance need not be contemporaneous with the event,
temporal proximity is a factor to be considered. State v. Wetzel, 868
P.2d 64, 69 (Utah 1993).
State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 240 (Utah 1995) (emphasis added). In the present case, the
temporal proximity of the statements may be considered in the context of satisfying the
concerns of the Confrontation Clause.
The third contextual factor indicating the statements' reliability is the subsequent
behavior of Ms. Brimhall. After Ms. Brimhall declared that "It's him," she continued to
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listen to the caller and to allow the police officer to listen. If she had been fabricating—
that is, if the caller was not "him" (Roger Alires)—it is doubtful that she would have
turned the call over to the officer's review. What we have in this context is a hearsay
declarant who spontaneously and contemporaneously submits her declaration to the
review of law enforcement. This act is a weighty indication of reliability.
Furthermore, additional, nonhearsay evidence substantiated Ms. Brimhall's
declaration. First,as discussed previously, there was the evidence of Appellant's earlier
appearance at Ms. Brimhall's apartment and his relationship with her, including the fact
that they have a daughter together. The caller's statements indicating a relationship with
Ms. Brimhall and references to their daughter create an obvious nexus between Roger
Alires and the caller. And when confronted by Officer Candland, who named the caller
"Mr. Alires" (Tr. at 41,1. 2), the caller did not object to this appellation.
Cumulatively, these indicia support a ruling that the hearsay offered in this case was
appropriately allowed not only as an excited utterance, but as evidence undeniably
"consistent with notions of fundamental fairness" on a constitutional level. Layton City v.
Peronek, 803 P.2d 1294, 1299 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
3. The case law submitted by Appellant can be distinguished
Unlike the many guarantees of trustworthiness in the present case, most of the cases
selected by Appellant, such as State v. Case (discussed above) or State v. Webb, 779 P.2d
1108 (Utah 1989), involve hearsay exceptions that are remote from firmly rooted
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exceptions like excited utterance. State v. Webb, for example, concerns a case where a
child's hearsay statement was allowed pursuant to a "hearsay exception spelled out in
section 76-5-411[, which] is a recent creation, not one that is 'firmly rooted' in common
law." Webb at 1112.
The situation in Webb, in fact, was so extreme that the majority of the Utah Supreme
Court held that remand to the trial court was not appropriate as it was "beyond credulity
that the law could allow a conviction to stand on such evidence." Id. at 1115. The child's
statement was uncorroborated and nonspecific. First, the child's statement at issue in
Webb was not offered to prove an element such identity, but (like in State v. Case) was
the primary evidence that any offense had occurred at all. The statement was not specific
as to the cause of any injury, and only contradictory evidence in the form of physicians'
diagnoses was produced as to whether or not there ever had been an injury, let alone as to
its cause. Webb, then, deals with a statement unsupported by any corroborating evidence
of the kinds previously discussed with regard to the present case, let alone an independent
witness who testified in court as to the corpus of the offense.
State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629 (Utah 1995) and State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah
1994), both dealt with the "former testimony" hearsay exception, which was expressly
distinguished in Inadi. (See also discussion of State v. Case, supra, in this section.) In
addition, in Menzies the witness was present at the trial but "unavailable" because he
refused to testify. Appellant pushes the limits of credibility with his assertion that,
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through Carter and Menzies, "the Utah Supreme Court has implicitly rejected the
holdings of Inadi and White." Br. of Appellant at 17.
Along the same lines, Appellant claims that in State v. Moosman, 19A P.2d 474
(Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court "appear[s] to ignore the holdings of Roberts, Inadi,
and White... ." Id. at 18. Moosman, however, was decided before White.
In any event, even if the Moosman criteria are applied to the present matter, the
second prong of those criteria are not met in this instance. "Second, we look at the
availability of the declarant and whether the presence of the declarant will add any
probative value to the evidence by allowing the trier of fact to observe the demeanor of
the witness." Moosman at 480 (emphasis added). With regard to the excited utterance
exception, the witness' demeanor at the time of trial adds nothing to the probative value
of a statement made simultaneously with extreme circumstances observed by an officer
many months prior. The trier of fact needs to weigh the sufficiency of that statement in
and of itself. Only separate and additional evidence can be offered by having the
declarant testify at trial. Such separate and additional testimony might have its own
probative value, whether cumulative or as rebuttal evidence, had Appellant himself called
the declarant as a witness. (See section IV., infra, for a discussion concerning Appellant's
options.) One way or the other, the evidence would have been separate, additional
testimony, not a repeat of the evidence, as is the case with prior testimony situations.

2?

Further, in Moosman the Court indicates that, "[o]n appeal, the burden is on the
appellant to show that each part of the test indicates that his right to confrontation was
violated by admission of the hearsay evidence." Moosman at 480. In Moosman, a
supervising pathologist had testified, rather than the pathologist who actually performed
the autopsy. The testifying pathologist's testimony was based in part on the written
hearsay of the latter pathologist, who was not present at trial.
The second part of the test requires that defendant show that the
testimony of Dr. Salazar[, the pathologist who performed the
autopsy,] would be more reliable than the testimony of Dr.
Sweeney[, the supervisor who testified]. ...
It is inconceivable that Dr. Salazar's testimony would be more
reliable than Dr. Sweeney's. The trial occurred approximately
eighteen months after the autopsy, and Dr. Salazar would likely have
had to rely on his own autopsy notes, as did Dr. Sweeny. Because Dr.
Sweeney supervised the autopsy and discussed the results with Dr.
Salazar, there is no reason to believe that Dr. Salazar's testimony
would differ from Dr. Sweeney's.
Id. at 480 (emphasis added). Given the context of the excited utterance in the present
case, it is also inconceivable that the testimony of a domestic violence victim would be
"more reliable" nine months later in a trial setting. Appellant here has not offered any
compelling reason as to why Ms. Brimhall's testimony at trial would have been more
reliable than the offered hearsay evidence under the excited utterance exception.
The Court in Moosman also relied in part on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals'
decision in Reardon v. Manson, 806 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1020
(1989), citing that case for the proposition that "[t]he confrontation clause is not
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necessarily violated by the prosecution's failure to produce a hearsay declarant for crossexamination at trial where the 'utility of trial confrontation' would be 'remote' and of
little value to either the jury or the defendant." Moosman at 481, quoting Reardon v.
Manson, 806 F.2d 39, 41 (2d Cir. 1986).

III.

T H E STATE CONSTITUTION'S CONFRONTATION CLAUSE SHOULD N O T B E
INTERPRETED DIFFERENTLY THAN THE FEDERAL CLAUSE

A. Appellant ignores cases which adopt the federal approach
In State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995), decided after Moosman, Menzies, and
Carter, the Utah Supreme Court incorporated the reasoning of the White court in the
context of analyzing Utah's excited utterance exception.
Even though excitement may in some instances distort a person's
perception or other cognitive powers that affect the accuracy of a
person's statements,[ ] it is, nonetheless, generally true that excited
utterances are likely to have greater evidentiary value to a trier of
fact than in-court statements to the same effect. In holding that the
excited utterance exception does not violate the federal
Confrontation Clause, Chief Justice William Rehnquist made that
point for the Court in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355-56, 116 L.
Ed. 2d 848, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992):
But those same factors that contribute to the
statements' reliability cannot be recaptured, even by
later in-court testimony. A statement that has been
offered in a moment of excitement—without the
opportunity to reflect on the consequences of one's
exclamation—may justifiably carry more weight with a
trier of fact than a similar statement offered in the
relative calm of the courtroom.
State v. Smith, 909 P.2d at 240-41.
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Other Utah cases suggest that, according to Utah tradition, a review of the
individual case is appropriate rather than an across-the-board rule.
Whether the use of documentary hearsay as a substitute for "live"
testimony by an accuser is violative of the Confrontation Clause
turns on the indicia of reliability of the document or statement sought
to be admitted. Id. at 65-66; United States v. Bell, 785 F.2d 640, 643
(9th Cir. 1986); State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 481 (Utah 1990);
State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1989); Bertul, 664 P.2d at
1183. We therefore consider whether the incident report was
endowed with sufficient indicia of reliability and accuracy so as to be
admissible, consistent with notions of fundamental fairness, as a
substitute for testimony by—and the corresponding opportunity for
cross-examination of—defendant's accuser...
Layton City v. Peronek at 1299. Also, in State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353 (Utah 1986) the
Utah Supreme Court examined the issue of unavailability in the context of a child's outof-court statement under Utah Code 76-5-411(1). Following its analysis under the federal
constitution, the court stated in Nelson that, "Although the issue has not been decided
under the Utah Constitution, we are not persuaded that the rule should be different."
Nelson, at 1356.
B. Appellant does not provide an analysis sufficient to show why the state
Confrontation Clause should be interpreted differently
Appellant has failed to provide an analysis of Article I, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution (Utah's Confrontation Clause) that shows why it should be interpreted
differently from prior Utah case law or federal law on this issue. "'Because appellants
failed to develop any meaningful state constitutional argument below, our analysis must
proceed solely under federal constitutional law.'" West Valley City v. McDonald, 948
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P.2d 371, 375 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), quoting State v. Dudley, 847 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993). Appellant states repeatedly that greater protections can be afforded, but he
has not shown why that is appropriate here, particularly in light of the breadth and impact
of the proposed, general "unavailability" rule.
As pointed out by Appellant, prior to Inadi and White, the Utah Supreme Court
adopted the federal approach, as embodied by the two-prong test of Ohio v. Roberts, in
State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981). Br. of Appellant at 23. As pointed out supra
in this brief, following Inadi and White, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the federal
approach again in State v. Smith. Nevertheless, the only historical rationale offered by
Appellant, without analysis, is a broad reference to persecution of polygamists.
State v. Villareal, 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995) and other cases are cited by Appellant
for the proposition that "under the Utah Constitution, the right to confrontation has been
specifically protected by Utah Courts." Br. of Appellant at 24. There is no doubt that the
Utah Constitution provides accused persons the right of confrontation. However, once
again, the cases cited by Appellant do not deal with the issue before this Court, but with
other kinds of confrontation issues or hearsay exceptions that are not "firmly rooted." One
of the closest proximities to the issue at hand is found in Villareal, which dealt with
hearsay admissions of an accomplice in crime. In Villareal, however, the admissions were
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"presumptively unreliable"6 (Villareal, at 419) rather than excited utterances, which are
"made in contexts that provide substantial guarantees of their trustworthiness" (White,
502 U.S. 355-356, 112 S.Ct. at 742-43).

IV.

THE QUESTION OF "AVAILABILITY" SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN TERMS OF THE
LEVEL OF THE OFFENSE

Appellant offers State v. Drawn, 791 P.2d 890 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), as one
example of case law indicating the kinds of actions that can support a finding of
unavailability. Br. of Appellant at 20. Of course, Drawn dealt with hearsay admitted
through the exceptions of rule 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, in which unavailability
is a statutory prerequisite for application of the listed exceptions. Nevertheless, if we
accept the Drawn factors simply as examples and apply them to the present situation,
Tiffany Brimhall would have to be considered unavailable, despite the trial court's brief
assertion to the contrary. (The trial court made no formal findings as to unavailability, but
simply stated at one point prior to trial that, "It's clear... [Ms. Brimhall is not] an
unavailable witness[. S]he's available, she's just not here." Tr. at 9,11. 17-19.)
The record indicates through a proffer on the part of the prosecutor that the
prosecution knew that Tiffany Brimhall was afraid of Appellant, but also that a victim

6

Post-arrest admissions of an accomplice, of course, are unlike statements of a coconspirator made in furtherance of a conspiracy, as in Inadi. See also note 2, supra,
concerning Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S.Ct. 1887 (1999).
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advocate7 had been in contact with Ms. Brimhall only five days prior to the trial (Tr. at 1,
11. 5-8), and that the victim advocate had informed the prosecutor (Id.) that the victim
advocate "was anticipating [Ms. Brimhall] being here." Id., 11. 8-9. Although Appellant
asserts that Ms. Brimhall "had not shown up for the original jury setting" (Br. of
Appellant at 21), there is no information in the record indicating why. Furthermore,
Appellant acknowledges that the victim advocate had been in contact with Ms. Brimhall
"over the course of several months." Id. Based on that continuous contact, the contact
with her only days before trial, and the victim advocate's representation to the prosecutor
that Ms. Brimhall was expected to be there, the reasonable intimation is that the City's
agents believed she would appear despite her nonappearance at the first jury setting.
The record, then, reflects only that the prosecution believed that a subpoenaed
witness had been contacted by an agent of the government within a matter of days before
trial and that the witness, though afraid, would be present. "Once the location of a witness
is known and the state is aware that efforts to secure voluntary compliance will be
unavailing, the state cannot simply choose to disregard statutory mechanisms to secure
the compulsory attendance of a witness." State v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Utah
1982) (emphasis added). In the present case, the prosecution believed that voluntary
compliance had been secured. There is no way the government can compel all witnesses
to appear, especially in the high-volume misdemeanor context.
7

The phrase "victim advocate" has been transcribed variously as "Dick Matick" and "Mr.
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In this brief, Appellee has assumed, arguendo, due to the lack of additional
information or findings on the record, that Ms. Brimhall was not legally unavailable.
Under that assumption, Appellee's position is that excited utterances, when found to be
sufficiently reliable based on their inherent reliability and on their context, can provide a
window back in time, acting as the closest thing to the truth that can be presented to a
trier of fact without an audio-visual recording of the incident itself. If evidence in the
form of an excited utterance is found to have the requisite indicia of reliability, it stands
on its own, with or without the declarant's presence.
Given the questionable availability of the witness, then, coupled with the high
level of reliability of the hearsay offered in this particular case, reversal is an
inappropriate remedy.
Furthermore, it is important to remember that such a hearsay exception is inclusive,
not exclusive. Allowing evidence of an excited utterance does not exclude the possibility
of rebuttal. As in the present case, Inadi involved a situation where a declarant
subpoenaed by the government simply failed to appear. And, as in Inadi, Appellant
himself did nothing to secure the declarant's testimony.8 To rebut the offered declaration,
Appellant could have attacked the declarant's credibility under rule 806 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence, which might have meant subpoenaing Tiffany Brimhall, and if necessary,

Matick" in the trial Transcript provided by Appellant.
There is no indication that the defendant ever attempted to produce Ms. Brimhall to act
as his own witness.
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requesting a continuance of the trial to obtain her presence. The same mechanisms for
securing compulsory attendance would have been available to Appellant. Instead,
Appellant simply counted on Ms. Brimhall's absence to minimize the evidence against
him, a routine defense strategy in domestic violence cases at the misdemeanor level.
If the "constitutional 'better evidence' rule" (Inadi, 475 U.S. at 396, 106 S.Ct at
1127) proposed by Appellant is adopted by this Court with regard to the excited utterance
hearsay exception, the primary tool for the prosecution of misdemeanor domestic violence
offenses would be all but removed. What Appellant is suggesting is that, on a routine
basis, victims of crime be forced by the government to appear. This approach is not only
impossible from a practical perspective, it is morally and politically objectionable in the
context of domestic violence cases.
To keep even firmly rooted, highly reliable hearsay exceptions from triers of fact
would put an unconscionable power into the hands of domestic violence offenders. By
influencing (whether through threats or promises) his victim not to appear at court, a
defendant could not only eliminate the risk of troublesome testimony, he could eliminate
an entire category of evidence that is "likely to have greater evidentiary value to a trier of
fact than in-court statements to the same effect." Smith, at 241. The reality is that
applying a broad unavailability rule even to firmly rooted hearsay exceptions would
serve only to denigrate "the trial's truth-determining process." White, 502 U.S. at 354,
112 S.Ct. at 742.
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Therefore, should this Court consider adopting the unavailability rule proposed by
Appellant or some variation of such a rule, Appellee urges this Court to review and
redefine "unavailability." Appellee urges this Court to define unavailability in terms of a
continuum based on the offense and the level of the charge. To put it bluntly, a lower
standard of "unavailability" should apply to misdemeanors. Such a distinction is already
applied in other legal analyses of a constitutional level. For instance, the constitutional
right to a trial by jury "is triggered by the type of punishment a defendant faces. See, e.g.,
Lewis v. U.S., 518 U.S. 322, 135 L. Ed. 2d 590, 116 S. Ct. 2163, 2167 (1996) (noting
Supreme Court case law has established that when defendant is charged with petty crime
carrying maximum six month prison term, Constitution does not guarantee right to jury
trial)." West Valley City v. McDonald at 374.
In misdemeanor cases of a class B level or less (which carry a maximum six-month
jail term), a similar distinction should be made with regard to Confrontation Clause
analyses. Such an approach would permit a finding of unavailability—for purposes of
introducing firmly rooted hearsay exceptions with significant indicia of reliability—when
a witness to a misdemeanor offense has been served with a subpoena and fails to appear.
The same finding of unavailability would apply when the government can show that the
witness could not be located at a single last known address.
This approach would acknowledge the reality of misdemeanor prosecution and
the inherent reliability of firmly rooted hearsay exceptions, while additional witness36

finding efforts could still be required in the prosecution of felonies and class A
misdemeanors. Furthermore, this approach would not prejudice defendants who truly
want to examine hearsay declarants, who can avail themselves of the statutory
mechanisms for compelling attendance.

V. THE OVERHEARD TELEPHONE CALL IS NOT HEARSAY

A. A statement by a party that is offered against that party is not hearsay
Appellant's Point III asserts that the trial court erred in admitting his statements
made over the telephone to Tiffany Brimhall and overheard by Officer Candland. This is
a strange and surprising assertion in a Telephone Harassment case, where the language
conveyed over the phone is the offense. In any event, Rule 801(d) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence reads as follows:
Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a
party and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or
a representative capacity... .
Appellant's claim that this section is inapplicable because Officer Candland was not a
voice recognition expert is not persuasive. Identification of the caller is one element of
the offense. Other evidence of identification,discussed at length supra in this brief, was
presented to identify the voice on the telephone. The caller's statements were then offered
as evidence against the owner of that voice.
Even without Rule 801(d), Appellant responds to his own Point III with his first
paragraph of that section. Hearsay is a statement offered to prove the truth of the matter
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asserted, and if "offered simply to prove that it was made, without regard to whether it is
true,. ... [it is not] proscribed by the hearsay rule." State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 335
(Utah 1993). The statements overheard by Officer Candland were not offered to show that
Appellant actually intended to kill Ms. Brimhall, or that it would in fact be prudent for her
to "watch the daycare." Tr. at 41,1. 1. To the contrary, the statements were clearly offered
to show that threatening language was conveyed over the phone to another person, in
violation of Salt Lake City's Telephone Harassment ordinance.
B. The threats made by Appellant were the offense at issue, therefore the
probativeness must outweigh any prejudicial effect
Appellant further states in his Point III that his telephone remarks overheard by
Officer Candland were "unfairly prejudicial." Br. of Appellant at 28. Appellant does not
explain the legal basis for this assertion. Presumably the argument is that the potential
prejudicial effect of the statements outweighs their probativeness under rule 403 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence. One may as well say that mentioning the fact that someone died
is overly prejudicial to a murder suspect. The threatening nature of what was said was the
crime. Given this, the probative nature of the statements is absolute.
CONCLUSION
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence permits evidence of "prior acts" when
offered to prove identity. Appellant's prior act of appearing at the apartment of Tiffany
Brimhall about an hour before the harassing telephone call was received was vital
evidence for showing the caller's identity. As a relatively bland act, which was offered to
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prove an element of the offense, the probativeness of Appellant's prior act far outweighs
any imagined prejudicial effect.
As a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the "spontaneous declaration," or excited
utterance, has been held by the U.S. Supreme Court to not violate the federal
Confrontation Clause even without a finding of the declarant's unavailability. Also, given
the context in the present case, where additional indicia of reliability are plentiful and the
declaration was offered only for identification purposes and not to show the corpus of the
offense, the allowed evidence satifies the concerns of both state and federal confrontation
clauses. No analysis has been provided to indicate that the state protections in this
instance should be different from the federal. In fact, case law indicates that the Utah
Supreme Court has already found the federal approach to be appropriate. Should this
Court decide to adopt some version of Appellant's proposed unavailability rule, Appellee
urges the Court to define "unavailability" based on the level of the offense and the
potential punishments.
As to Appellant's claim that the telephone caller's statements were hearsay, rule
801(d) establishes that statements by a party, which are offered against that party, are not
hearsay. And because the threats made by Appellant embodied the charged offense, the
probative nature must outweigh any prejudicial effect.
Therefore, this Court should affirm the conviction.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~2\ ~ day of March, 2000.

Assistant City Prosecutor
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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ADDENDUM
Rules cited in this brief
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Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence
inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by
these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not
relevant is not admissible.
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Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or
waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
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Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; exceptions;
other crimes.
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the
crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a
character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case
to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in
Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident. In other words, evidence offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant for
a non-character purpose and meets the requirements of Rules 402 and 403.
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Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 801, Definitions.
The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal
conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is (A)
inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness denies having made the
statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered
to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or
improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after
perceiving the person; or
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is (A)
the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a
statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a
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statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject,
or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of
the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a
statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy.
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Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial.
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:

(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.
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United States Constitution
Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
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Constitution of Utah
Article I, Section 12
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function
of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless
otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any
preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by
statute or rule.
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